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Abstract—This letter presents a cryptanalysis of the modified
McEliece cryptosystem recently proposed by Moufek, Guenda
and Gulliver [24]. The system is based on the juxtaposition of
quasi-cyclic LDPC and quasi-cyclic MDPC codes. The idea of
our attack is to find an alternative permutation matrix together
with an equivalent LDPC code which allow the decoding of any
cipher-text with a very high probability. We also apply a recent
technique to determine weak keys [4] for this scheme. The results
show that the probability of weak keys is high enough that this
variant can be ruled out as a possible secure encryption scheme.
Index Terms—Post-quantum cryptography; McEliece cryp-
tosystem; QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of finding a practical solution for quantum
resistant cryptography has become an urgent issue, mainly
for two reasons: the existence of a quantum polynomial time
algorithm [29] that breaks the actual RSA and ECC solutions
and the improvements of classical algorithms for the discrete
logarithm in small characteristic [2]. Among the possible
candidates for post-quantum cryptography, code-based cryp-
tography is one of the most promising solutions [6]. It is also
one of the oldest public key encryption solutions thanks to
McEliece’s idea [21].
In the original paper, McEliece proposed to use binary
Goppa codes, which remain unbroken, to date. Other families
of algebraic codes were proposed (see [25], [31], [14] ect).
But they were successfully cryptanalyzed, mainly due to their
algebraic structure [9], [22], [32]. Probabilistic codes were also
considered: concatenated codes were analyzed in [28], [31];
convolutional codes were proposed in [17], but successfully
cryptanalyzed in [16]. Polar codes were also proposed in [30]
and cryptanalyzed in [3].
The emergence of all these attacks on several variants of the
McEliece cryptosystem shows the importance and necessity
of proposing new masking techniques. For example a code
with an efficient decoding algorithm could be masked with
the use of an arbitrary code in order to sustain the security of
the scheme. This technique was proposed for the first time by
Wieschebrink in [35] to avoid the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack
[32]. The idea is to use the juxtaposition of a Generalized
Reed-Solomon code and a random code. This solution became
famous since it was also used in the case of Reed-Muller codes
[12]. But these two variants were broken using the square code
technique in [8], [26]. Nonetheless the idea was not totally
abandoned since Wang [34] proposed to use the juxtaposition
of a GRS code with a random code and then to multiply
the generator matrix of the resulting code with a matrix that
linearly combines the columns of the GRS and the random
code. The main motivation is to obtain a random like code in
the end.Another technique was introduced in [18] where the
authors propose to use the “u|u + v” construction with two
GRS codes. This new trend also inspired researchers to use
the juxtaposition of LDPC and MDPC codes [24]. This is the
variant that we analyze in the present article.
a) Our contribution: We describe a key recovery attack
against the modified McEliece cryptosystem based on the
juxtaposition of LDPC and MDPC codes [24]. The idea of
our attack is to find an alternative permutation matrix together
with an equivalent LDPC code which allow the decoding of
any cipher-text with a very high probability.
II. BACKGROUND ON CODING THEORY
Throughout the paper we denote by F2 the finite field with 2
elements and Mk,n (F2) the set of k × n matrices with entries
in F2. The Hamming weight wt(x) of a vector x ∈ Fn2 is
the number of non-zero coordinates of x. A binary linear
code C of length n and dimension k is a k-dimensional linear
subspace of Fn
2
. A generator matrix of C is any k × n matrix
G ∈ Mk,n (F2) with rows that generate C . The dual C ⊥ of C
is the n − k-dimensional linear subspace defined by
C
⊥
=
{
z ∈ Fn2 : ∀c ∈ C ,
∑
i
cizi = 0
}
.
A parity check matrix of C is a generator of C ⊥.
Definition 1. A (n, k, ω)-code is a binary linear code defined
by a k × n parity-check matrix (k < n) where each row has
weight ω. When n →∞ we define
• An LDPC code is a (n, k, ω)-code with ω = O (1) [11].
• An MDPC code is a (n, k, ω)-code with ω = O (√n) [23].
Furthermore we will use the (n, k, ωldpc) notation, respec-
tively (n, k, ωmdpc). The original decoding technique for LDPC
codes is the well-known bit flipping algorithm [11]. This
2technique is known to provide an error-correction capability
which increases linearly with the length of the code, but de-
creases with the weight of the parity-checks. Therefore MDPC
codes suffer from a degradation in decoding performance,
compared with LDPC codes. A full description of the bit
flipping algorithm can be found in [7], [11], [23].
Remark 1. Since the performance and the correctness of the bit
flipping algorithm depend on the density of the parity-check
matrix, any equivalent parity-check matrix that respects the
density condition enables a correct decoding algorithm.
III. MOUFEK, GUENDA AND GULLIVER’S CRYPTOSYSTEM
In [24] Moufek, Guenza and Gulliver proposed a McEliece
type cryptosystem, based on LDPC and MDPC codes. The
scheme is composed of three algorithms: key generation
KeyGen(·), encryption Encrypt(·) and decryption Decrypt(·).
a) KeyGen(n, k, t1, t2) = (pk, sk):
• Pick a generator matrix G1 of a (n1, k, ωldpc) LDPC code
C1 that can correct t1 errors, and a generator matrixG2 of
a(n2, k, ωmdpc) MDPC code denoted C2 that can correct
t2 errors.
• Pick at random S in GLk(F2) and an n × n permutation
matrix P , where n = n1 + n2.
• Compute Gpub
def
= SGP , where G = (G1 | G2) .
• Return pk = (Gpub, t1, t2) and sk = (S,G1,G2,P ).
b) Encrypt(m, pk) = z:
• Randomly generate e = (e1 | e2) ∈ Fn2 with e1 ∈ Fn12 ,
e2 ∈ Fn22 , wt(e1) = t1 and wt(e2) = t2.
• Compute z =mGpub + e.
c) Decrypt(z, sk) =m:
• Compute z∗ = zP −1 and decode using the bit flipping
algorithm for C1 and C2. The output is m
∗ ∈ Fk
2
.
• Return the message m∗S−1.
Remark 2. During the decryption, we have z∗ =
mS (G1 | G2)+
(
e∗
1
| e∗
2
)
with
(
e∗
1
| e∗
2
)
= eP −1 and e∗
1
∈ Fn1
2
.
The authors of this scheme propose to use the decoding
capability of both LDPC and MDPC codes to find e∗
1
and
e
∗
2
. However, we emphasize that one can obtain wt(e∗
1
) > t1 or
wt(e∗
2
) > t2. This can imply a failure in the decoding algorithm
of C1 or C2. But both situations cannot occur simultaneously
since these would then imply that wt(eP −1) > t. It is also
important to remark that obtaining e∗
1
or e∗
2
is sufficient to
recover mS and thus m.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE MOUFEK, GUENDA AND
GULLIVER’S SCHEME.
We propose here a key recovery attack against the previous
cryptosystem. One of the key points in our attacks is the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. A parity check matrix of the public code is
H
′
=HP =
©­«
Hldpc 0
0 Hmdpc
A B
ª®¬P ,
where Hldpc ∈ Mn1−k,n1 (F2) is the low weight parity-check
matrix of the LDPC code, Hmdpc ∈ Mn2−k,n2 (F2) the low
weight parity-check matrix of the MDPC code, (A | B) ∈
Mk,n1+n2 (F2) a full-rank matrix such that G1At +G2Bt = 0
and A,B , 0.
Proof. The proof is obvious since we have H ′Gt
pub
= 0. 
This proposition shows the existence of a sufficient number
of codewords with weights ωldpc in the dual of the public
code. We represent this set of codewords by the matrix
H
∗ ∈ Mk∗,n1+n2 (F2) , each row of H∗ being an element
of the set and conversely. Since these codewords of weights
ωldpc contain the rows of
(
Hldpc 0
)
P , we have rank(H∗) ≥
n1 − k. One can expect to have rank(H∗) > n1 − k but
our practical experiments always gave an equality, that is to
say rank(H∗) = n1 − k. In the sequel we can suppose that
k∗ = n1 − k. If k∗ > n1 − k, one can select only n1 − k rows
of H∗ that are linearly independent.
The attack starts with a search for codewords of weights
ωldpc.
a) Search of codewords of weights ωldpc : This step
aims to find the rows of the matrix H∗ ∈ Mk∗,n1+n2 (F2) .
Assuming without loss of generality that an adversary knows
the value of the parameter ωldpc, this step can be achieved
by applying any of the ISD variants such as, for example,
Dumer’s algorithm [10]. This issue is discussed in detail in
Section V, where a complexity analysis of our attack is given.
We emphasize that ωldpc can be easily guessed during this step
by starting with ωldpc = 1 and increasing up to the value that
satisfies the condition rank(H∗) = n1 − k.
Remark 3. At the end of this step we have managed to build
the matrix H∗ ∈ Mk∗,n1+n2 (F2) that generates the same code
as
(
Hldpc | 0
)
P and therefore has n2 zero columns.
Proposition 2. There exists a permutation matrix P ∗ such that
H∗P ∗ =
(
H∗
1
| 0) with H∗
1
∈ Mk∗,n1 (F2) . Such a matrix can
be computed with complexity O(n) and satisfies
•
(
Hldpc | 0
)
PP ∗ =
(
HldpcP1 | 0
)
,
• PP ∗ =
(
P1 0
0 P2
)
.
P1 and P2 being permutation matrices of sizes n1 and n2
respectively.
Proof. The existence of P ∗ comes directly from Remark
3 which also provides
(
Hldpc | 0
)
PP ∗ =
(
HldpcP1 | 0
)
.
Furthermore, this last equality with the fact that P1 and PP
∗
are permutation matrices imply that PP ∗ =
(
P1 0
0 P2
)
where
P2 is also a permutation matrix. To finish, given the matrix
H∗, a matrix P ∗ can be easily computed by identifying the
n2 zero columns of H
∗. 
This proposition shows that a cryptanalysis is able to find an
alternative permutation matrix P ∗ together with a parity check
matrix H∗
1
of an equivalent LDPC code that can correct the
same number of errors as the secret one. In the sequel, we are
going to show that the pair
(
P ∗,H∗
1
)
is sufficient to decode
any cipher-text with a high probability.
3b) Decryption with
(
P ∗,H∗
1
)
: We show here the way
to decrypt any cipher-text with P ∗ and H∗. Let e∗ = eP ∗ =(
e∗
1
| e∗
2
)
and z∗ = zP ∗ =
(
z∗
1
| z∗
2
)
with e∗
1
, z∗
1
∈ Fn1
2
. So
z
∗
=
(
mGpub + e
)
P
∗
=mS (G1P1 | G2P2) +
(
e
∗
1 | e∗2
)
.
This implies that z∗
1
=mSG1P1+e
∗
1
. Since SG1P1 generates
an LDPC code with parity-check matrix H∗
1
, we can recover
e∗
1
using the bit-flipping algorithm, assuming that wt(e∗
1
) ≤ t1.
In the next paragraph we prove that the probability that
wt(e∗
1
) ≤ t1 is asymptotically close to 1 when the length of
the codes goes to infinity.
Theorem 1. For i ∈ {1, 2} let ni, ti be integers such that ti < ni
with n1 = γn2 and t1 > γt2, where γ ≥ 1. Let x = (x1 | x2)
be a random vector over F
n1+n2
2
with wt(x) = t1 + t2, where
xi ∈ Fni2 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then we have
Pr(wt(x1) > t1) < t2
(
n1
t1+1
) (
n2
t2−1
)(
n1+n2
t1+t2
) .
Proof. First notice that we have
∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ t1 + t2 , Pr(wt(x1) = i) =
(
n1
i
) (
n2
t1+t2−i
)(
n1+n2
t1+t2
) . (1)
Using the latter probability we obtain by a simple compu-
tation
Pr(wt(x1) = i)
Pr(wt(x1) = i + 1)
=
(i + 1)(n2 − t1 − t2 + i + 1)
(n1 − i)(t1 + t2 − i)
.
Hence for any i ≥ t1 + 1 we obtain
Pr(wt(x1) = i)
Pr(wt(x1) = i + 1)
≥
(t1 + 2)(n2 − t2 + 2)
(n1 − t1)t2
. Replacing n1 = γn2 and t1 > γt2 in the
latter fraction we obtain that
∀ i ≥ t1 + 1 we have Pr(wt(x1) = i) > Pr(wt(x1) = i + 1)
(2)
From (2) and (1) we deduce the desired result. 
When t1 and t2 are linear in the code length we obtain the
following asymptotic approximation
Corollary 1. Let n2 = n, n1 = γn and t1 = αn1, t2 = βn2 with
β < αγ ≤ 1/2. Then when n →∞ we have
Pr(wt(x1) > t1) < cα,β,γ
√
n2
−n
(
(γ+1)h(α+ β−α
γ+1
)−γh(α)−h(β)
)
,
where cα,β,γ is a constant and h is the binary entropy function.
Proof. Apply the Stirling approximation for factorials and
expand the series to obtain the result. 
V. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS.
a) Complexity analysis: The work factor of computing
an alternative private key (P ∗,H∗) is given by the work
factor of the low weight codewords search algorithm plus
the computation required to find P ∗. The first step can be
done using any of the ISD variants such as Dummer (D-
ISD, [10]), May, Meurer and Thomae (MMT-ISD, [19]) or
Becker, Joux, May and Meurer (BJMM-ISD, [5]) or May
and Ozerov (MO-ISD [20]). These algorithms have a time
TABLE I
THE PROBABILITY Pr(wt(x1) > t1 ) FOR t1 = n1/20 AND t2 = n2/40 WITH n1 = 4k AND n2 = 2k . THE FIRST
ROW IS THE EXACT VALUE FOR THE PROBABILITY AND THE SECOND ROW IS THE UPPER BOUND FROM THEOREM 1,
NAMELY ubk, t1, t2
= t2
( n1
t1+1
) ( n2
t2−1
)/(n1+n2
t1+t2
)
. THE THIRD ROW IS THE ASYMPTOTIC VALUE OF THE UPPER
BOUND FROM COROLLARY 1, I.E. ubk,α,β,γ =
√
n2
−n
(
(γ+1)h(α+ β−α
γ+1
)−γh(α)−h(β)
)
.
k 6851 8261 9857
log2 (Pr(wt(x1) > t1)) -117 -141 -166
log2
(
ubk, t1, t2
)
Thm1 -110 -133 -159
log2
(
ubk,α,β,γ
)
Cor1 -106 -129 -155
complexity equal to O(e−ω ln(1−k/n)(1+o(1))), as long as ω = o(n)
when n → ∞ [33]. Hence, in our case computing the
matrix H∗ requires a work factor asymptotically equal to
O(e−ωldpc ln(k/(n1+n2))(1+o(1))), when n1 + n2 tends to infinity.
Regarding the complexity of computing P ∗, it requires n1+n2
basic operations (here we consider binary additions of length
k binary vectors). Thus the complexity of our attack, denoted
by WFA(n1, n2, k, ωldpc) is in the worst case dominated by the
cost of the best ISD variant.
b) Numerical results: We analyze the effective cost of
our attack on some practical parameters. Firstly we considered
suggested values given in [24], more precisely n1+n2 = 16128.
As for the co-dimension we analyzed three different cases,
n1 + n2 − k ∈ {8064, 10080,12096}. Hence the complexity of
finding the codewords of weight 15 in the dual of the public
code ( i.e. ωldpc = 15), using the BJMM-ISD variant equals
26.13, 210.97 respectively 219,20. The computations were done
using a PariGP implementation similar to that in [27]. The
probability Pr(wt(x1) > t1) (for these parameters) is given in
Table I. These results show that the parameters proposed in
[24] are too vulnerable to be considered in practice.
One might generate a more resistant set of parameters for
the scheme, which fact we illustrate in Table II. However, it is
important to consider the weak keys approach, a recent tech-
nique introduced in [4], where the authors use the Extended
Euclidean algorithm in order to recover a private key given a
public key. We compute the probability of weak keys for the
Moufek et al. variant with reasonable parameters in Table II.
TABLE II
THE PROPORTION OF WEAK KEYS AND THE COMPLEXITY OF OUR ATTACK AGAINST THE MOUFEK ET AL. MCELIECE
VARIANT USING A (4k, k, ωldpc ) LDPC CODE AND A (2k, k, ωmdpc ) MDPC CODE.
(k, ωldpc) (6851, 36) (8261, 44) (9857, 54)
log
(
WFA(4k, 2k, k, ωldpc)
)
80.9 101.6 127.4
Proportion of weak keys 2−7.3 2−10.6 2−14
Remark 4. In the first place we remark that the key size for the
[24] scheme is considerably greater than for similar schemes
such as [1], [23].
Notice from Table II that the odds of generating weak keys
are too big to imagine that the scheme can be protected against
this type of attack. Indeed, we find that the scheme might
be secured against the weak keys approach by increasing the
values of the ωldpc. But in order to obtain reasonable secure
parameters this solution is equivalent to replacing the LDPC
4code with an MDPC code and thus is of no interest compared
with the MDPC McEliece variant [23].
Remark 5. It is also worth mentioning the recent reaction
attacks against the QC-MDPC scheme [13] and the QC-
LDPC scheme [15]. This technique can be used to recover
the structure of the MDPC code in the case of Guenda’s et al.
variant. Nonetheless we remark from Theorem 1 and Corollary
1 that the weight of x2 is likely to be much bigger than the
error capacity of the MDPC code. Hence, one might not be
able to retrieve the initial message unless it uses the LDPC
code.
However, the reaction attack remains highly interesting in
similar constructions, namely in the case of the direct sum
or Plotkin sum of LDPC and MDPC codes. Indeed, in these
cases attacking the LDPC code with our technique is not
sufficient for retrieving the initial message, and thus revealing
the structure of the MDPC code is necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a successful cryptanalysis of the
McEliece variant in [24]. Our attack exploits the structure of
the dual of the public code and its complexity is dominated
by the low weight search algorithm on this dual. The attack
is entirely based on finding the structure of the LDPC code,
regardless of the nature of the second code. As a consequence,
our result can be applied even if the MDPC code is replaced
by another code.
We notice that this variant is also vulnerable to the weak
keys approach [4], since the proportion of weak keys is not
negligible. Hence, one can consider that the McEliece variant
[24] is too vulnerable to be practical. We also emphasize that
similar constructions, such as the direct sum or Plotkin sum
of MDPC and LDPC codes can be attacked by combining our
technique with the latest reaction attacks.
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